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Dead Men in Torts: Lord Campbell's Act Was Not Enough
VERNON X. MILLER*
This article is an essay on death statutes and torts. It is not a text because
there is little profit nowadays in laying down the law.' People everywhere
in 1970 are reappraising the social structure, and lawmen cannot escape.
Lawyers can be creative, or they can be stubborn. They can respond with
imagination, or they can wait for pressures. But legislating and judging are
constant processes, and the law does catch up with the community. There
will be much reappraising in the personal injury business during the nine-
teen-seventies. Death cases are part of that business.
Death can be related to a tort, or it can happen after the accident from
other causes while a claim for damages is pending. It can happen to an in-
jured victim, and it can happen to a tortfeasor. All kinds of death-tort
cases have been hard for lawyers to crack. For generations judges have
been circumscribing them with common law absolutes and strict statutory
construction. That story is background for the reappraisal.
The plaintiffs' world-a long time coming
The civil suit for damages is the greatest resource of the common law. It is
bigger than torts, but the personal injury business has captured most of its
facilities. The theory and the actuality of the civil suit are law to the com-
munity. People are involved in every case as injured persons and tort-
feasors. Employers and insurance carriers have become just as important
as the individual tortfeasors, but there has to be a tortfeasor in every case,
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America School of Law. A.B., Uni-
versity of Minnesota, 1923; LL.B., University of Minnesota, 1925; J.S.D., Yale, 1929;
Member of District of Columbia, Minnesota and Wisconsin bars.
1. Even if the climate were good, I would not try to write a textbook on death
cases. There are countless decisions which can be related only to experiences in
certain states. I have tried to be positive. Anyone can find cases and statutes to
support something different from most of my propositions. But I stick to my guns.
In every state the story is just as good or just as bad as the one I have laid out in this
paper.
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and he is always a people. He can be hard to find in some nonfeasance
cases, but we suppose that somewhere among a hierarchy of employees there
is someone who forgot to close a door or to tighten a bolt. Res ipsa loquitur
solves many hard cases. The basic standard for measuring conduct is the
standard of the reasonably prudent man. The measures for price are com-
pensation and punishment. Ambiguities, inadequacies and inconsistencies
stick out all over the procedures, but the ambiguities get resolved, the in-
adequacies are patched up and the inconsistencies are rationalized.
The variety of people and events involved in torts defies classification by
legislatures or judges. Lawsuit by lawsuit the system comes up with ad-
justments related to specifics of time and place and cast of characters.
Text writers cannot describe it as it is,2 but lawyers learn to absorb it and
to understand it. Perhaps they are so close to the civil suit that they cannot
see it as it is. They can never argue to a judge that a lawsuit is a forum
where a man's obligations to his neighbors are measured by popular con-
vention. Demurrers and proximate cause have lots of muscle. A plaintiff
must state a cause of action. He cannot complain about a practical joke
if embarrassment is his only hurt.3 A defendant does not have to underwrite
the cost of everything that happens as a result of his inadvertence. But the
actuality is there; the civil suit for damages is wide open. Anyone who
can get a lawyer can claim damages for what he thinks is an injury. The
actuality of limitation is real also, although the circumscribing can seldom
be reduced below the generalities of the reasonably prudent man, proximate
cause or scope of employment.
The civil suit for damages has practical limitations. Jurors are not always
bright, and judges are not always wise. Some kinds of controversies cannot
be resolved adequately through the civil suit.4 A judgment for damages is
2. You can take your pick from Corpus Juris, American Jurisprudence, or any
state digest. I hestitate to peg any authors by name.
3. This proposition defies citation except indirectly. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La.
735, 84 So. 37 (1920) looks as if it is on the nose. It is not easy to cut Nickerson
down to size. Judge Dawkins did not cite another case in his opinion. The victim
was an excitable person with a history of mental illness. Apparently she did not
suffer any disability after the hoax, but she did allege in her petition that she had
spent money and that she had lost business on account of the prank. In every re-
ported practical joke case there is some other effect than mere embarassment. See
Johnston v. Pittard, 62 Ga. App. 550, 8 S.E.2d 717 (1940); Newman v. Christensen,
149 Neb. 471, 31 N.W.2d 417 (1948); Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442,
140 N.E.2d 322 (1955).
4. It is not practicable to break down measures comparable to the standard of the
reasonably prudent man into issues for the court and jury in police arrest cases.
See Wimberly v. City of Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 183 A.2d 691 (Super. Ct. 1962);
Fields v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 334, 151 N.E.2d 188, 175 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1958).
Claims arising from mass torts like the Minnesota forest fires of 1918 and the
Ringling Brothers fire in 1944 cannot be resolved through civil suits. See Holister v.
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worthless against a defendant without money. Lawyers cannot afford to
represent clients who cannot pay. Nor can every injured person win. He
may not have a case for fault, or he may be barred by his own misconduct.
All this is primer stuff. Lawyers know all about contingent fees and insur-
ance. They know they cannot litigate every case, and they learn how to
tell the bad ones from the good-good that is for responsibility and price.
The system is loose. It does not always square with certainty or logic. And
that is good. Looseness has served justice well. Judges and jurors could not
discover solutions related to the intricate combinations of specifics in multi-
tudes of civil suits if the system were rigid.
Judges have tightened some of the ambiguities of the reasonably prudent
man with statutory negligence.5 They have opened many areas to plaintiffs
that were closed two generations ago, but lawmen are not always creative and
generous. In an adversary system defendants' lawyers are constantly ar-
guing for restrictions on plaintiffs' claims. A hundred years ago judges lis-
tened willingly to scare stories from defendants' counsel. They came up
with privity of contract in products liability,6 the fellow servant rule, 7 and
strict construction of Lord Campbell's Act.
No legal scholar has done enough grubbing to write a history of the civil
suit in the United States. To get part of the job done someone will have to
Ulvi, 199 Minn. 269, 271 N.W. 493 (1937) (on the forest fires); 60 YALE L.J. 1417
(1951) (on the circus fire); cf. Comment, Procedural Devices for Simplifying Litigation
Stemming from a Mass Tort, 63 YALE L.J. 493 (1954). Because the United States
was involved, the Texas City explosion cases looked practicable under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. A trial court found for the plaintiffs in a test case, but the Supreme
Court decided that the Act did not cover policy choice mistakes by top government
officials. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
5. Is violation of a statute negligence per se, or is it merely evidence of negli-
gence? There is no majority or minority rule. It all depends on the case and the
statute or the ordinance. Sometimes the statutory provision is vital and sometimes it
is merely relevant. There can be commitments to both ideas in one state. Cf. Whetzel
v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960), noted in 10 CATHOLIC U.L.
REV. 44 (1961). Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943). Whether or
not contributory negligence can be a defense in a statutory negligence case depends
on what the court thinks a legislature was trying to protect. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223
Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947). When a statute is a codification of the common
law, a violation creates a presumption of negligence. See Satterlee v. School Dist.,
29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947).
6. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). On its facts this
was not a products liability case. Nevertheless, the court's dictum was historic.
Judges everywhere picked it up in true products liability cases. Economic facts looked
big. A tradesman could not stay in business if he had to cover personal injuries
sustained in the using of his products by anyone but a customer. Judge Sanborn
tried to canonize the rule and the exceptions in Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
7. Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837). You can detect the
scare stories in Lord Abinger's judgments both in Winterbottom and Priestley. Courts
in the United States picked up the idea of fellow servant from this court just as they
19701
Catholic University Law Review
cover what he thinks are key states, but he should cover everything in the
states he chooses. After a little bit of grubbing in Minnesota, Louisiana, the
District of Columbia and New York, it is easy to put a finger on a crucial
decade. Before 1915 it was a defendants' world. Judges were strict about
evidence sufficient to support a verdict, about proximate cause and scope of
employment, and they sat tight on damages. Plaintiffs rarely got more
than $50,000 in personal injury suits.s Since 1925 it has been a plaintiffs'
world. The big step-up in damages began in the nineteen-forties. 9  Palsgraf
was obsolete when it was decided in 1928.10
The ramifications of the plaintiffs' world extend into products liability,"'
immunity of charitable corporations, 12 even governmental immunity,' 3 and
attractive nuisance, 14 just to name a few areas. These ramifications extend
would do with privity of contract. See Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4
Met.) 49 (1842); Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 1 McMullan 251 (S.C. Ct. Err.
1841). Apparently South Carolina did it on its own before the judges could read
Priestley v. Fowler. These were just the first. See also Hubgh v. New Orleans &
C.R.R., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851) discussed in the text.
8. See Miller, Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 14 MINN. L.
REv. 216, 245-46 (1930).
9. According to my chronology the first one was Avance v. Thompson, 320 Il1.
App. 406, 51 N.E.2d 334 (1943), rev'd, 387 Ill. 77, 55 N.E.2d 57, cert. denied, 323
U.S. 753 (1944).
10. Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99. Palsgraf was one of the
greatest put-ons in American case law. It was not a hoax or a fraud because the
judges were good men. Both Cardozo and Andrews molded the record to fit their
theories. Cardozo picked Bohlen as his prophet. He preached the doctrine of the
foreseeable plaintiff. That kind of measure is too obvious to be good. A judge can
never use it in instructions to a jury. It is usable only when he articulates a decision
for a defendant on a motion for a directed verdict.
The Long Island Railroad could have believed that Mrs. Palsgraf was faking.
Her symptoms were subjective. She testified that a penny weighing scale "blew"
after the explosion and struck her. She had no broken bones, but she did show some
bruises. She was treated for shock and sent by ambulance to a hospital from which
she was soon released. The explosion was a big one. Part of the railroad platform
was blown away. You can read all about it on the front page of the New York Times
for Monday, August 25, 1924. Twelve other people were injured and taken to hos-
pitals. What happened to the other claims? The Long Island Railroad does not tell.
I have tried to find out.
11. So much has been written in this area that citations are superfluous. See, e.g.,
Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966) where a bystander outside the
line of distribution was struck by a defective automobile. See also Products Liability-
A Symposium, 19 Sw. L.J. 1 (1965).
12. See, e.g., Miller, Personal Injury Litigation in School Cases, 20 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 60 (1955).
13. Historically, policing and school-keeping were the sacred cows among gov-
ernmental functions. Immunity for cities and counties in these areas was absolute.
It has been cracked. Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(the District was charged in a schoolground maintenance case); Harbin v. District
of Columbia, 336 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (the District was charged when a police
dog attacked a bystander); Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957)
(the town had to cover the costs of the tort when jailers failed to protect the security of
a prisoner).
14. See McGettigan v. National Bank, 320 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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also into loss of consortium, especially when a married woman claims dam-
ages because of her husband's injuries, 15 but loss of consortium is an
anachronism;' 6 extending the plaintiffs' world into this area proves that logic
can be sentimental. In the plaintiffs' world judges are no longer tight about
scope of employment, proximate cause and what it takes to build a case for
negligence. More cases are resolved by jurors on issues of fact evaluation.
The manifestations of the plaintiffs' world are many,' 7 but they have been
slow to reach death cases. The common law absolutes were too well en-
trenched, and judges were too cautious about remedial statutes.
There can be all kinds of explanations for the shift from a defendants' to
a plaintiffs' world. It could be that lawmen have been reappraising the com-
munity's needs constantly and matching the law to necessity. The real ex-
planation is more down to earth. We get the kind of tort law the community
can afford to support in dollars and cents. Employers, most automobile
owners and many householders nowadays can pay for their torts. In every
state there is some kind of pressure on automobile owners to carry liability
insurance.' 8  Commercial firms cannot remain in business without public
liability protection. Most of the insurance story is good. One part of it is
not so good. Inflation is rampant. Judgments are big, and so are premiums.
It is possible that the system can price itself out of business.
The superficial grubbing in four states suggests another proposition. Per-
sonal injury cases were few and far between until the last two decades of the
nineteenth century.' 9 Even then most of the defendants were railroad com-
15. It all began with Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950) a workmen's compensation case. Hitaffer was over-
ruled four years later on the exclusive remedy in compensation issue, but the decision
on loss of consortium remains. Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957). The idea in Hitajfer caught on. New York
succumbed in 1968. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239
N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305. Maryland recognizes a kind of community in-
terest in loss of consortium. See Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d
514 (1967), noted in 17 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 382 (1968). In Thill v. Modem
Erecting Co., - Minn. -, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969), the Minnesota Supreme Court
returned a case to a trial judge with instructions to hear a wife's claim for loss of
consortium. The husband won at the trial and accepted $375,000 in damages. The
size of the husband's verdict is the tip-off. A wife has a claim for loss of con-
sortium only when her husband has been hopelessly crippled. The husband has
already been compensated for loss of time and impairment of earning capacity. The
wife cannot get a divorce, and she cannot acquire another mate legally.
16. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact oj Insurance, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 228-29 (1953). That many courts have climbed on the band-
wagon since 1953 does not make Jaffe look bad. It was just that he and a dozen
other tort teachers turned out to be poor prophets.
17. See Miller, Tort Law in Evolution, 5 TPIAL, April-May 1969, at 32-33.
18. I am thinking of extended tort liability statutes against automobile owners,
standard automobile liability policies, financial responsibility, compulsory insurance
and unsatisfied judgment laws.
19. The first five volumes of the Minnesota reports are thin. There is a slander
1970]
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panies or street railways. 20  Casualty insurance was not practicable until
people had to buy it for automobile using; the supporting base had to be
widespread. There were assault and battery cases in the older reports, even
more than there are today. Many of them occurred in small towns or
country places among farmers. 21  Their neighbors in the jury box were
almost as cautious about price as the judges. Damages for broken bones ran
from five hundred to a thousand dollars. There were more nonpolitical def-
amation cases a century ago. James Fenimore Cooper was especially liti-
gious. 22
The historic English cases were landmarks because they were so few:
Baker v. Bolton,23 Priestley v. Fowler,24 Winterbottom v. Wright 2  and
Davies v. Mann.26  Common law lawyers were adept at spinning much legal
theory from thin materials. You wonder how there could be enough money
involved in these cases to support all the lawyers. There were barristers
and solicitors on each side. Barristers had to be paid when the briefs were
delivered. Losing parties had to cover all attorneys fees. In the United
States conditions were not the same. Judicial proceedings were less formal
and less expensive2 7 and American lawyers must have known about contin-
case in Volume 1, St. Martin v. Desnoyer, 1 Minn. 156 (1854). There is not a
personal injury case or one on defamation in all of Volume 2. Volume 3 has one
personal injury case, a claim against the City of St. Paul for street injuries. St.
Paul v. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297 (1859). There is a trover case in Volume 3 that explains
much. The defendant borrowed the plaintiff's horse and rig. The defendant was
thrown when the horse ran away. The carriage was smashed and the horse was
killed. The horse owner was the successful plaintiff, and he recovered the value of
the horse and rig because of the defendant's bad driving. Bennett v. Gillette, 3
Minn. 423 (1859). Volume 4 has one libel case, Hemphill v. Holley, 4 Minn. 233
(1860). Volume 5 has one on assault and battery, Ward v. Haws, 5 Minn. 440
(1861).
20. You can add to railroads and street railways a lot of factory owners who were
sued for work injuries on the safe place exception. It is significant that the defendants
were railroads in the first fellow servant cases and the first wrongful death cases.
See the cases cited in note 7 supra. See also Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass.
(1 Cush.) 475 (1848); Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465, 5 N.Y.S. 215 (1861).
21. You think of the cases you have been using in class for many years. Seigel
v. Long, 169 Ala. 79, 53 So. 753 (1910); Frew v. Teagarden, 111 Kan. 107, 205 P.
1023 (1922); Germolus v. Sausser, 83 Minn. 141, 85 N.W. 946 (1901).
22. In volume 24 Wendell for 1840, Cooper was a plaintiff twice, Cooper v.
Barber, 24 Wend. 105 (against a newspaper editor); Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434
(against a book reviewer). In that same volume there is one other defamation case,
Bissell v. Cornell, 24 Wend. 354 and an assault and battery case, Cowden v. Wright,
24 Wend. 429.
23. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). Of course there were more tort cases in
England than the four mentioned in the text. Nor is it so that the four in the text
are more leading than the others. It is just that tort cases were few.
24. 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
25. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
26. 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).
27. See 2 A. BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF LINCOLN 215-54 (1928).
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gent fees before the Civil War. Nevertheless, the over-all appraisal stands
in the United States as in England. Tort cases were few and far between.
Death and tort-in combination, an enigma for lawmen
It was in this kind of constrictive climate that common law lawyers pro-
claimed the absolutes about death. A cause of action died with the dece-
dent. That proposition covered the waterfront; death of the victim or the
tortfeasor killed all possibilities for litigation. Neither his estate nor his
relatives could collect for economic loss after the injured man died, and a
plaintiff before judgment had no recourse against a tortfeasor's estate.
Blackstone's explanation was cryptic and irrelevant: the civil suit is ab-
sorbed in the offense against the state. 28 So was Lord Ellenborough's ex-
planation in Baker v. Bolton.20 He said that the death of a human being
could not be complained of as an injury. Nevertheless, Lord Ellenborough
recognized that a husband has an interest in his wife's injuries so long as she
lived. Baker did have a cause of action for loss of consortium. Mr. and
Mrs. Baker had been passengers in the defendant's coach. They were in-
jured in an upset. Mrs. Baker died thirty days later. The husband was
successful as a plaintiff in his own right for injuries to himself and for loss of
consortium until his wife's death. The damages altogether amounted to one
hundred pounds. Costs added to the judgment could have been substantial.
One hundred pounds in 1808 was a large sum. Perhaps the damages and
costs were big enough to justify the work of all the barristers and the attorneys
on both sides of the case. The action stopped at the trial.
Baker v. Bolton was decided in 1808. Lord Campbell's Act was passed in
1846.30 Legislatures could afford to wait long in the defendants' world.
Nor did Lord Campbell's Act meet all the implications from the common
law propositions.3 ' All Parliament did in 1846 was to set up a routine for a
personal representative to sue a tortfeasor for the benefit of a decedent's
wife, husband, parent and child. It would give Mr. Baker more than the little
28. It is hard to pin this down in Blackstone. See Judge Benning in Shields v.
Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854) quoting Blackstone, "The public mischief is the thing . ...
In these gross and atrocious injuries, the private wrong is swallowed up in the public."
Id. at 351. "[W]ith regard to injuries affecting the life of man, they do not fall under
our present contemplation; being one of the most atrocious species of crimes, the subject
of the next book of our Commentaries." 2 COOLEY'S BLACKSTONE 419 (4th ed. 1899).
29. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
30. Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
31. The case law under Lord Campbell's Act is just as thin as the tort cases in
the early American reports. Statutory interpretation was even tighter in England than
it was in the United States. See Berry v. Humm & Co., [1915) 1 K.B. 627; Osborn v.
Gillette, L.R. 8 Ex. 88 (1873).
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bit he could get for loss of consortium. Lord Campbell's Act did not protect
the estate of an injured man who died from causes other than the injury be-
fore he could litigate his claim.3 2 Nor did it help an injured man or a per-
sonal representative who could not sue a dead tortfeasor.38
The climate since 1925 is so different from what it was a century ago
that lawyers cannot analyze with understanding the explanations for the ab-
solutes in death cases. Nevertheless, the common law absolutes and strict
construction were consistent with the climate of the nineteenth century.8 4
They are not consistent with the trend in the twentieth, but judges hewed to
the tight line about death and torts down to the nineteen-sixties. If it is a
mystery, perhaps it can be explained. The law about death was dug so deep
that judges were trapped. Most of them did not try to escape. Judging
is easier when magistrates can rely on legalisms and precedents.85
The first tranquilizer was the legalism about the new cause of action. In
death cases, so the judges said, there was no common law to help them.
Actions for death by wrongful act had to be created by the legislature, and
judges were not free to develop a statutory scheme by decision. Not all
legislatures in the United States enacted copies of Lord Campbell's Act.
Most of them did, but some in the beginning provided that all tort actions
shall survive.86 Courts in Louisiana and Iowa agreed that these statutes
covered death as well as injuries. 37  Lawmen have been sweating through
problems of draftsmanship and strict construction for more than four genera-
tions. In every state by this time legislatures have supplemented Lord
32. Abatement was cured in 1934 when Parliament codified all the statutes on
wrongful death and survivorship. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of
1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41. See Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826; Fatal Accidents
Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 65. Abatement in the United States is discussed in the text.
33. Perhaps there is some court somewhere that has decided otherwise, but the case
law is top heavy. Even under Lord Campbell's Act the cause of action died with the
tortfeasor. Some cases are discussed in the text. See also Ryan v. Ortgier, 201 Mo.
App. 1, 208 S.W. 856 (1919); Estes v. Riggins, 68 Nev. 336, 232 P.2d 843 (1951);
Burford v. Evans, 191 Okla. 555, 132 P.2d 653 (1942); Tuttle v. Short, 42 Wyo. 1,
288 P. 524 (1930).
34. Not all judges were sold on the absolutes. See Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349(1854). Judge Benning criticized Blackstone and Baker v. Bolton. The court in the
Kingdom of Hawaii did not follow Baker v. Bolton. A widow recovered $1,100 in
1860 for the wrongful killing of her husband by manslaughter. Kake v. Horton, 2
Hawaii 209. Nevertheless causes of action died with an injured person who died
from causes other than the tort. See the legislative history and the common law
background discussed in Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d
96 (1962).
35. A legalism is a doctrinal development or statutory interpretation on the level
of judge-made law. It is a policy choice with a restrictive effect. Literally it is con-
sistent with the taught law, but it could have been different.
36. IOWA CODE § 2502 (1851), IOWA CODE § 611.20 (1966); No. 223, [1855] La.
Laws 270, LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1970).
37. See generally Jones, Civil Liability for Wrongful Death in Iowa, 10 IOWA L.
BULL. 169 (1925), 11 IOWA L. REV. 28 (1925).
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Campbell's Act with some kind of scheme for survival. The pace has been
slow, but perhaps it was just as well for everybody. Legislation in the
nineteenth century was deadly stuff. Survival and death by wrongful act
were not recognized as complementary.
Even a hundred years ago some things about death cases could have been
different. In 1861 Chief Judge Comstock of the New York Court of Ap-
peals tried to persuade his colleagues that Lord Campbell's Act was remedial.
The case was Whitford v. Panama R.R.38 It was an action against the Rail-
road by a personal representative for the benefit of the next of kin of a
decedent who was killed when he was on the defendant's train in the Isthmus
of Panama. The defendant was a New York corporation authorized to build
and operate a railroad in New Granada. The decedent was a resident of
New York. So was the personal representative, and so were the beneficiaries.
But the court agreed with the Railroad's lawyers. The case could not be
processed under the New York statute because the accident did not happen
in the state. Nor was the case covered by the common law. The plaintiff
had failed to prove the law of New Granada, although the courts of New
York would be open to him if the policy of the statute in New Granada was
not inconsistent with the law of New York.39 The trial judge had sustained
a demurrer to the complaint and judgment was affirmed through the General
Term and the Court of Appeals.
Chief Judge Comstock dissented. The court permitted him to publish an
opinion which he had prepared for another case in which the judges had
agreed to the disposition although not all of them had concurred in the
opinion. In the other case an injured man had accepted a settlement before
he died. After his death a personal representative began an action for the
38. 23 N.Y. 465, 484.
39. This opens a wide area for discussion on conflicts problems which are not di-
rectly related to the theme of this paper. Perhaps the most notorious cases are on
damages. Does the court of the forum have to recognize the statutory limitations on
price from the law of the place of the accident, or can the court let price be fixed under
local law? The choice is not quite that simple, but it has been resolved in favor of
the forum and on constitutional grounds. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309
F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
Some other problems are easier, and there is diversity of opinion. Before there was
a survival statute in the District of Columbia, the court of appeals would not permit
a case to be litigated against a dead tortfeasor's estate even though action was per-
mitted under the law of the place where the accident occurred. Woollen v. Lorenz,
98 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1938). In Minnesota, when there was no survival statute,
the court did permit this kind of case to be tried. Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn.
225, 234 N.W. 314 (1931). On the conflicts problems New York has come a long
way from Whitford. See Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282
N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967). Courts can be generous about periods of limitation and recog-
nize the longer period of the place of the accident instead of the shorter period of the
forum. Wilson v. Massengill, 124 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 686
(1942).
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benefit of the decedent's next of kin. Apparently all the judges agreed that
the claim had been discharged, but there is no published opinion for Dibble
v. New York & Erie R.R. in the reports of the Court of Appeals. An opinion
of the General Term is published in Volume 25 of Barbour on page 183.
Judge Comstock's opinion for Dibble was published as a dissent in Whit-
ford.
The Chief Judge agreed with his colleagues that "purely personal wrongs
died with the person who received them."'40  He did not try to explain or
justify the common law. He did say that it was "manifestly unjust." He
believed that legislatures were trying to cure that kind of injustice with stat-
utes like Lord Campbell's Act. There were limits to the statutory scheme
which the judge recognized; the statute covered only those cases where death
followed from an injury. Judge Comstock proposed a hypothetical about
the injured man who lingered for days or weeks or months before he died.
In such a case, the Judge argued, a personal representative should recover
for the expenses of the illness, loss of time and pain and suffering as well as
damages to cover the pecuniary losses to the special beneficiaries. Imme-
diately in Whitford he would have let the plaintiff litigate the case in New
York because the legislature had removed the limitation on the common law.
Judge Comstock's colleagues were not persuaded. Lord Campbell's Act
was in derogation of the common law. The legislature had created a new
cause of action. Literally the statute was effective only for cases which arose
in New York. His colleagues did not buy Judge Comstock's solution for
Whitford, nor did they buy his theory. But the Judge identified a problem
which has plagued lawyers and judges for a hundred years. What do you do
for the estate to allow it to recover economic losses when a man lingers for
weeks or months before he dies as a result of his injuries? This question
suggests another which Judge Comstock did not touch. What do you do for
the estate of an injured man who dies from causes other than the injury?
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia grappled
with Judge Comstock's hypothetical in 1954. By that time Congress had
adopted two statutes for the District of Columbia, one for wrongful death 41
and one for survival of tort claims. 42 In Hudson v. Lazarus43 the court
stretched one of the statutes to afford a remedy for a case falling primarily
under the other. It was a landmark case, and it deserves extended discus-
sion later in this paper.
40. 23 N.Y. at 484.
41. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2701 to -2703 (1967).
42. Id. § 12-101.
43. 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Cautious action by legislatures and judges on
wrongful death and survival
Nineteen-twenty-one is a long time ago for tort lawyers. There is a Massa-
chusetts case from that year which has all the earmarks of old-fashioned
case law. Several boys were fishing on a pond in the Connecticut River
below the Turner Falls dam. A power company, the defendant in the case,
owned the land around the pond and controlled the water level behind the
dam. The boys were trespassers. They had disregarded signs, but people
from the neighborhood fished frequently in the pond. There was reason to
believe that employees of the company should have known that the boys were
on the pond. These employees gave no warning when they opened the dam
and let the water flow down the river. Two of the boys were drowned when
they tried to escape from the flood. Action was begun by a personal repre-
sentative of one of the boys against the power company in Prondecka v.
Turners Falls Power & Electric Co.44
The text of the Massachusetts statute reveals its history.45 It is different
from most other statutes like Lord Campbell's Act. Damages are penal and
they are assessed against tortfeasors according to culpability. The statute
was built floor by floor, against towns for defective highways, against carriers,
then railroads and at a later time against street railways. At the time of
Prondecka it was effective against all other tortfeasors for negligence. 46
Massachusetts is strict about trespassers even when they are minors. 47 The
case against a landowner must depend on gross misconduct. In Prondecka
the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, but the defendant's exceptions were
sustained in the Supreme Judicial Court. The only evidence of fault related
to gross misconduct, and that was not covered by the statute. "A statute
cannot be extended by construction," Justice Jenney said, "[n]or [can] a
statute [be] enlarged because it does not give a remedy for something of
more flagrant character than that to which it applies."'48 The court would
not escape from the common law rut in 1921, and the court stayed there in
another case like Prondecka as late as 1956 .4  Perhaps that was the one
that did the trick because the legislature cleaned up the statute in 1957 to
cover every kind of wrongful death.50
The Massachusetts statute is long and dull and obsolete in style even in
1970. Damages have always been limited by a ceiling, but now the limit is
44. 238 Mass. 239, 130 N.E. 386 (1921).
45. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, §§ 1-6F (Supp. 1970). See, e.g., § 2, id.
46. Ch. 375, [1907] Mass. Acts 324 (repealed 1946), cited in Prondecka.
47. See Chronopoulos v. Gil Wyner Co., 334 Mass. 593, 137 N.E.2d 667 (1956).
48. 238 Mass. at 243-44, 130 N.E. at 388.
49. Corrado v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 333 Mass. 417, 131 N.E.2d 201.
50. Ch. 238, § 1, [1958] Mass. Acts 122.
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$55,000 instead of $10,000. Perhaps the Massachusetts court has learned
something about statutory construction from the Supreme Court of the United
States. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act responsibility depends on local
law. Damages are compensatory, but by special reference the statute is ex-
tended to those states where price fixing is punitive under the local law. In
Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. United States51 the Court agreed
with the plaintiff and held that even in a Massachusetts case litigated under
the Federal Torts Claims Act, damages are compensatory, and they are not
affected by the Massachusetts ceiling.
By many standards Minnesota is a progressive state. In death cases it has
been stubborn. There is still a ceiling of $35,000 on damages., 2 Even now
on a plaintiff's side, a cause of action abates with the death of the injured
man."" It can be saved only when a claim has been liquidated by verdict. 54
This Minnesota story is a shifting to another level about death, but survival
and wrongful death are so closely related that even under Lord Campbell's
Act, most courts agree, the death of a tortfeasor abates the action.55 Not
until well along in the automobile era did the legislature in Minnesota allow
for litigating claims against the estates of dead tortfeasors. 56 And this special
statute was necessary in cases involving wrongful death.57 In 1941 the legis-
lature amended the survival statute: claims for bodily injuries or death
caused by the negligence of a decedent could be litigated against his estate.
In Lavalle v. Kaupp58 the plaintiff was a minor who was attacked by the de-
fendant's dog. Also in Minnesota there was a dog statute. 59 The owner of a
dog was liable in damages to a person who was attacked by the dog without
provocation. The dog owner in Lavalle died after the summons and com-
plaint were served on him. The plaintiff did not have a chance at the trial
or on appeal. The survival statute did not cover statutory torts. You wonder
how the court would have reacted if the plaintiff had relied on scienter.
Literally that was not covered by the survival statute.
51. 352 U.S. 128 (1956).
52. Only eleven states have retained the money limit on damages. After returns
are in for 1969, the number could be smaller. According to my computation the
eleven states are Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Oregon, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Idaho is practical about the
limitation. The limit is $10,000 unless the tortfeasor is insured. IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 5-327 (Supp. 1967).
53. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.01 (Supp. 1970).
54. MINN. STAT. § 540.12 (1967); cf. Cooper v. St. Paul City Ry., 55 Minn. 134,
56 N.W. 588 (1893).
55. See cases cited note 33 supra. See also Ickes v. Brimhall, 42 N.M. 412, 79
P.2d 942 (1938); McFadden v. Rankin, 46 R.I. 475, 129 A. 267 (1925).
56. Ch. 440, [1941] Minn. Laws 809.
57. Green v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 500, 5 N.W. 376 (1880).
58. 240 Minn. 360, 61 N.W.2d 228 (1953).
59. MINN. STAT. § 347.22 (1967).
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The Minnesota legislature waited long to cure the statute, not as long as
Massachusetts, but they waited fourteen years.00 And as in Massachusetts
there was another case that finally turned the trick. In Dahl v. Northwestern
National Bank6' a tavern keeper sold liquor to an intoxicated man who left
the tavern to drive his automobile. Thereafter the intoxicated customer, who
was not carrying automobile liability insurance, collided with another auto-
mobile causing property damage and personal injuries. There was a liquor
selling statute in Minnesota which controlled this kind of case, 62 but the tavern
keeper died before the case could be finished. As in Lavalle the court
agreed with defendant's counsel; the cause of action was not covered literally
by the survival statute. Both Dahl and Lavalle have been erased by the new
statute.
In 1953 the Utah legislature tried hard to cure the local wrongful death
scheme and to cover survival of tort actions with a blanket amendment:
"Causes of action arising out of physical injury to the person or death...
shall not abate on the death of the wrongdoer." 63 Nevertheless in Fretz v.
Anderson64 the Utah Supreme Court decided that even under that statute a
"cause of action cannot arise at a time beyond the life of the tortfeasor."65
The facts of Fretz were fantastic. At two o'clock in the morning on a high-
speed country highway the plaintiff rammed her car into an automobile that
was stalled in her lane. The stalled car was headed in the wrong direction.
The decedent's body was hauled from the wreck. There was physical evi-
dence to indicate that the decedent had been driving fast, that his car had
swerved across the highway, hit an obstruction and had rolled back onto the
highway to the place where it was when the plaintiff hit it. Also there was
an eye witness who had seen the decedent driving fast several miles away
from the wreck. Contributory negligence was an issue in the case, but there
was evidence that the plaintiff had been blinded by lights from a truck
whose driver had stopped on the shoulder of the highway across from the
stalled car seconds before the plaintiff rammed it. In the action against
the decedent's estate the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal to
the supreme court the judges discovered a reason to reverse. Everything
in the opinion seems to lean plaintiff's way until the court picked up the argu-
ment about the scope of the statute. The court said the cause of action
60. Ch. 158, § 1, [1967] Minn. Laws 282.
61. 265 Minn. 216, 121 N.W.2d 321 (1963).
62. MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1967).
63. Ch. 30, § 1, [1953] Utah Laws 67, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12 (Supp. 1967).
This section was amended in 1967 to allow for survival to a plaintiffs estate when the
injured man dies from causes other than the tort. Ch. 217, § 1, [1967] Utah Laws 580.
64. 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d 642 (1956).
65. Id. at 300, 300 P.2d at 649.
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could not survive unless the decedent was alive at the time of the accident.
This was the first case under the amended statute. Although the court was
ready to help the plaintiff with presumptions, the judges insisted that time of
death had to be submitted to the jury.
A majority of the Utah court has had some second thoughts. It is difficult
to determine whether or not the court overruled Fretz in Meads v. Dibblee6
because the second case was one for wrongful death. Two young people
were driving on a country highway, the driver of the car and his fianc6e. The
driver pulled his car to the right of the highway to make a left turn in front
of a truck that was rolling along behind him. The truck hit the car broad-
side. The driver of the car was killed instantly. The girl lived a few days
longer. In the action by the girl's father against the young man's estate, the
trial judge granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
cause of action was not in existence at the time of the tortfeasor driver's
death. On appeal judgment was reversed by a three to two vote. "A
liberal construction of this statute to effect its objects and promote justice
as well as the direct wording of its last part requires that the statute be
not so limited. We reach this conclusion notwithstanding what we said
about this statute in Fretz v. Anderson."167 It was the same court with one
change in personnel after Fretz. The new judge was one of the dissenters.
Some laborious catching up in Louisiana
and the District of Columbia
The Louisiana story is special and not because of the civil law tradition. In
one sense it is typically conventional and typically Anglo-American. In
1851 the Louisiana Supreme Court followed Baker v. Bolton. In Hubgh v.
New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. 8 the court held that a surviving spouse does
not have a cause of action because of her husband's death. As in Baker v.
Bolton, so in Hubgh, the defendant was a common carrier. In Hubgh the
decedent was an employee. He was a locomotive engineer who was killed
when a steam boiler exploded. The Louisiana court gave the local juris-
prudence two injections from the common law. The judges followed Priest-
ley v. Fowler as well as Bolton and committed Louisiana to the fellow servant
doctrine. The possibilities for case law development on death by wrongful
act were just as barren in the civil law as in the common law tradition.
Counsel for the plaintiff filed a long brief when the case was reheard.6 9
66. 10 Utah 2d 229, 350 P.2d 853 (1960).
67. Id. at 236, 350 P.2d at 858.
68. 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851).
69. Id. at 498.
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There was something in the French cases that did not square with Black-
stone. Apparently in France there were possibilities that members of a
murdered victim's family could be paid something from the penalty assessed
against a criminal. Nevertheless that was not enough to persuade the Lou-
isiana judges that the civil law tradition was different from the common law.
The Louisiana legislature responded in 1855 by adding a provision to
Article 2294 of the Civil Code of 1825.70 That Article was a summary of
tort law in France and in England as it was at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges
him by whose fault it happened to repair it."'71 That is still the first sentence
in Article 2315, the present survival provision in the Civil Code. After 1855
"the right of this action shall survive in cases of death, in favor of the minor
children and widow of the deceased or either of them, and in default of
these, in favor of the surviving father and mother of either of them for the
space of one year from the death." '72
Ten years later the Louisiana Supreme Court tagged the Act of 1855 as
one affecting survival of actions and not a local copy of Lord Campbell's
Act.73 From the time of Edward Livingston there was an article in the
Code of Practice about survival. A cause of action did not abate after an
answer was filed.74 That covered civil suits for damages including torts.75
After 1855 torts were covered by Article 2294(2315) of the Civil Code.
Subsequent attempts to enlarge the provision in the Code of Practice did not
affect the specific prescription in the Civil Code about survival in tort.70
Other clauses and paragraphs have been added to Article 2315, especially
to allow for other relatives as alternate beneficiaries. 77 In 1884 the legisla-
ture added an important paragraph to allow legal survivors to recover also
70. No. 223, [1855] La. Laws 270.
71. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1970).
72. No. 223, [1855] La. Laws 270-71.
73. Earhart v. New Orleans & C.R.R., 17 La. Ann. 243 (1865). See Comment,
Wrongful Death and Survival of Tort Actions in Louisiana, 1 LOYOLA L. REV. 84
(1941).
74. Article 21. The Code of Practice has been redrafted and renamed. It is now
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure (1960). In the new Code Article 21 is Article
428. The text has been amended: "An action does not abate on the death of a party."
LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 428 (West 1960).
75. Vincent v. Sharp, 9 La. Ann. 463 (1854). That one was just under the wire
before the Act of 1855.
76. See No. 239, [1946] La. Laws 738. Cf. Comment, Survivorship and Wrong-
ful Death Actions as Affected by Louisiana Act 239 of 1946, 4 LOYOLA L. REV.
75 (1947). Nevertheless, the changes in the Code of Practice did not affect per-
sonal injury cases. Maher v. Schlosser, 144 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 1962).
77. This is a shortcut footnote. The several acts are paraphrased or quoted in the
annotations to Article 2315 in West's Annotated Civil Code of 1952. The present
text of the Article is in the 1970 Supplement.
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damages for the pecuniary loss they suffered through the wrongful death.78
Experiences in Louisiana with Article 2315 look like those in the other
states. Judges have been just as tight about statutory construction. In the
other states many of the hard cases are about abatement from the death of
tortfeasor. Louisiana has not done anything about that specifically because
that part of the problem has been reduced by the Article in the Code of a
Practice, and it has been reduced drastically since 1930 by the direct action
statute against insurance carriers.79 The strict construction in Louisiana has
related to abatement on the plaintiffs' side through the death of legal sur-
vivors.
There is more in the Louisiana cases than strict construction about abate-
ment. Much of it is good. The original Act of 1855 plus all the changes
since that time cover survival when an injured man dies from causes other
than the tort.80  Pain and suffering, loss of time and expenses of the illness
are all part of the assessment. In all death cases under Article 2315 pain
and suffering can be vital in affecting price. Before 1884 pain and suffering
had to be the biggest factor to support a big claim for damages in wrongful
death.
This is not the kind of paper for an extended discussion on damages,
even in death cases, but pain and suffering does suggest a digression which
is related to every kind of tort case. There is much double talk in the law.
Most of it is intellectually honest because lawmen can become tedious when
they try to spell out step by step their explanations for every proposition in a
case. There is a place for summaries and for figurative classifications.
Lawyers understand what judges mean when they distinguish between com-
pensatory and punitive damages. Literally a trial judge sometimes tells
a jury that they can add to the price an extra sum as a warning to everyone
not to do it again.81 It is not easy to understand judges who announce that
no punitive damages can be assessed against any defendants in their juris-
78. No. 71, [1884) La. Laws 94.
79. No. 55, [1930] La. Laws 122, LA. REV. STAT. § 22.655 (Supp. 1970).
80. Dumas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 241 La. 1096, 134 So. 2d 45
(1961); Payne v. Georgetown Lumber Co., 117 La. 983, 42 So. 475 (1906). Louisiana
has not done well in death cases where relationships between decedents and survivors
are not legitimate. See Board of Comm'rs v. New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 65 So. 2d
313 (1953). But a constitutional issue is involved. A state cannot discriminate against
survivors because their relationship to a decedent is not legitimate. Glona v. American
Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
There is another hole in the statute which does not suggest a constitutional issue. If
there is no survivor, an estate cannot recover any economic loss from the tortfeasor,
not even expenses of the death. Young v. McCullium, 74 So. 2d 339 (La. App. 1954).
81. This is hornbook stuff. Everybody knows it, but see an old case: Beach v.
Hancock, 27 N.H. 223, 224 (1853).
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dictions, but that is what the Louisiana judges say.s2 And so do the judges
in Massachusetts.8 3 You could believe them if they declared that trial judges
cannot give instructions on punitive damages, but damages in assault and
battery and defamation have to be punitive in the great majority of cases.
In every tort there are two intertwining ideas behind the price a jury fixes;
damages are related to the conduct of the defendant and/or to the condition
of the plaintiff and what he needs to cover his economic loss. In an assault
and battery case when doctor bills are modest and damages reach five hun-
dred to a thousand dollars,8 4 price is assessed according to the defendant's
conduct no matter how the judges classify it. Anything reaching four digits
in defamation is punitive. 5
Without pain and suffering in tort cases, many claims would not be worth
litigating. That needs a word of explanation. From the point of view of any
claimant economic loss is vital. Under the adversary system plaintiffs have
to pay lawyers for their services. Most tort victims cannot afford to pay
retainers. They need the possibilities of the contingent fee. Without pain
and suffering where injuries are not permanent and where they do not result
in death, few cases would be good enough to justify the expense of a lawyer's
fee. Before 1884 pain and suffering had to be large in Louisiana to make
a death case worthwhile. Even in 1970 it can be vital, especially when the
survivors are adult brothers and sisters who were not dependent on the de-
cedent for support. Nor is Louisiana the only state where pain and suffer-
ing means much in death cases. Massachusetts is another. Pain and suffer-
ing in that state are now important only in determining whether or not an
extra count can be added to a death case,86 but in times past the right to
recover anything at all depended on whether or not a decedent had groaned
while he was unconscious after the accident. 87
This discussion on damages has been a digression in the middle of the
Louisiana story. The rest of that story relates to abatement through the
death of survivors. It is a story of strict construction, common law tech-
82. See O'Neill, J., in McVay v. Ellis, 148 La. 247, 252, 86 So. 783, 785 (1921).
83. See Holmes, J., in Burt v. Advertiser News. Co., 154 Mass. 238, 245, 28 N.E. 1,
4 (1891).
84. McVay v. Ellis, 148 La. 247, 254, 86 So. 783, 785 (1921), O'Neill's case is on
the nose. The injuries were minor, so were the doctor bills, and there was a one day
loss of time. Even after O'Neill's sermon, damages were fixed by the court at $1,000.
85. Compare another Louisiana case, Jackson v. Briede, 156 La. 573, 100 So. 722
(1924) where publication was restricted, no special damages could be shown, and the
price was $2,500.
86. See Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 138 N.E. 808 (1923). There may be two
causes of action, one under survival and one for wrongful death, and they should be
joined. Conscious suffering is a damage factor under survival. Cf. De Marco v.
Pease, 253 Mass. 499, 149 N.E. 208 (1925).
87. See Battany v. Wall, 232 Mass. 138, 122 N.E. 168 (1919).
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niques, and family a curative amendment. In Chivers v. Roger8  a father
sued to recover damages for the death of a son. It was in 1898. The
plaintiff died while the action was pending, and his heirs were cited as parties
to the lawsuit which the trial judge then dismissed. The supreme court af-
firmed; the cause of action was personal to the survivor.
It did not appear in Chivers that there were any alternate survivors, but
there were such survivors in Kerner v. Trans-Mississippi Terminal R.R.8 9
The decedent's mother was the legal survivor who died before the action was
tried. The adult brothers and sisters began another lawsuit. This one was
not so easy. Although the trial judge dismissed the suit, a court of appeals
reversed,00 holding that the claim arising out of the decedent's death was
transmitted to the collaterals through the mother. The supreme court re-
versed the court of appeals and clinched the case for abatement. The cause
of action abated with the death of the first survivor even if there were
statutory beneficiaries on another level.
The court gave up a little bit in Castelluccio v. Cloverland Dairy Products
Co.91 If there was a liquidation of a survivor's claim, even before judgment
was final, the award was an asset of the survivor's estate. So matters stood
until 1960 when the Louisiana legislature amended Article 2315 to provide
that the right to recover damages under the Article is a property right which
on the death of a survivor is inherited by the "legal, instituted or irregular
heirs."'92 We shall have a comment on that kind of remedy later in this ar-
ticle.
In Louisiana the legislature first attacked death problems with a survival
statute which was interpreted to include all kinds of death cases. In most
states, legislatures began with Lord Campbell's Act. A man had to die from
his injuries before anyone could sue under the statute. Even then causes of
action might abate through the death of the tortfeasor or the death of a
beneficiary. In most states survival statutes were added later. Not until
lawmen realized that insurance carriers were profiting by the common law
rule on abatement did legislatures move fast to let all kinds of plaintiffs reach
the resources of dead tortfeasors.93  It is doubtful that some legislatures
88. 50 La. Ann. 57, 23 So. 100.
89. 158 La. 853, 104 So. 740 (1925).
90. Kerner v. Trans-Mississippi T.R.R., I La. App. 129, 131 (1924).
91. 165 La. 606, 115 So. 796 (1927).
92. No. 30, § 1, [1960] La. Laws 99, 102.
93. I do no pretend to have a complete tabulation. My reading of every statute
leads me to believe that there is some kind of survival on this level in every state. In
Louisiana it is effected primarily through the direct action statute. But legislative
action was long delayed in some states. I mention just a few. California: ch. 1380,
[1949] Cal. Laws 2400; District of Columbia: 62 Stat. 487 (1948); Florida: ch.
26541, § 1, [1951] Fla. Laws 114; Minnesota: ch. 440, [1941] Minn. Laws 839;
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would have moved at all if they had to create remedies just for plaintiffs
who died from other causes while claims were pending. The total of the
economic losses in those cases would not be big enough to suggest a gross
injustice. But when legislatures did respond, they did it most often with
general statutes affecting survival on both sides in death as well as personal
injury cases.94
In a wrongful death case where an injured man lingers long before he
dies, and when the cause of action for personal injury survives, two causes of
action are intertwined. At first glance it is arguable that survival covers
only one kind of case,95 death from other causes, and that wrongful death
covers what it says literally, damages to a beneficiary who has suffered a
pecuniary loss. But if a man has lingered long, the economic loss can be
substantial. Expenses of the illness and death should be assessed against
the tortfeasor, but they are not covered in Lord Campbell's Act unless a legis-
lature adds it specially. Judge Comstock saw all that in 1860 and argued
to his colleagues that the remedy of the death statutes should be construed
to cover all the manifest injustices. Hudson v. Lazarus9" in the District of
Columbia is that kind of case.
In Hudson a pedestrian was hit by an automobile driven by a person with-
out the owner's consent. The owner's insurance company did not have to
underwrite the claim. Also, the driver of the car was an employee of a
service station operator whose public liability insurance had lapsed. At
least it was the contention of the insurer that the policy had lapsed. The
pedestrian's injuries were serious. He was confined in the United States
Naval Hospital in Bethesda from the date of the accident, May 3, 1949
until April 7, 1951, the date of his death. There is nothing in the opinion
to suggest that Hudson was not represented right after the accident. Never-
theless, action was not begun until November 2, 1950. The long delay is
understandable. Neither insurance company would settle the claim, and the
operator's company would not defend him. The statutory period of limitation
Wyoming: ch. 124, § 1, [1947) Wyo. Laws 151. See also New York: ch. 795, [1935J
N.Y. Laws 1532. Literally the New York statute did not cover wrongful death. See
Gibson v. Meehan, 7 N.Y.2d 93, 163 N.E.2d 874, 195 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1959) where the
tortfeasor died before the victim. The court relied on legislative history, not strict
construction, and the action did not abate.
94. I could be wrong, but as I read the statutes survivorship on the plaintiff's side
still is not covered in Minnesota and New Mexico.
95. There are some older cases in which the courts support this distinction. See
Graham v. Central of Ga. Ry., 217 Ala. 658, 117 So. 286 (1928); Holton v. Daly, 106
Ill. 131 (1882); McCafferty v. Pennsylvania R.R., 193 Pa. 339, 44 A. 435 (1899).
Although there are problems about joinder, it is true generally that survival covers
both death and personal injuries.
96. 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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for tort is three years in the District.97 After the plaintiff died, his lawyers
petitioned the court to appoint the decedent's surviving wife as a personal
representative with permission to continue the lawsuit.
By 1951 Lord Campbell's Act had been on the books for many years.98
Hudson died from his injuries on April 7, 1951. Had the year been 1941
instead of 1951, the lawyers would have moved immediately to process the
case under the death statute. The case pending for personal injuries would
have abated. In 1941 the personal representative under Lord Campbell's
Act could have recovered specially for the costs of the illness and funeral,
and she could have recovered for herself as beneficiary the pecuniary loss
she had suffered through the decedent's death. She would not have recov-
ered anything for the loss of time while the decedent was in the hospital.
The trial judge would have told a jury that they should measure the widow's
pecuniary loss by what she would have received as gifts and support from
her husband during the remainder of their joint lives. 99 In 1951 when
Hudson died they could have moved immediately with the same kind of
lawsuit under the death statute, and they could have continued the pending
lawsuit through a personal representative.
In 1951 the survival statute in the District of Columbia was three years
old. The lawyers for Mrs. Hudson thought of survival first. With the serious
injuries, the long stay in the hospital and the pending lawsuit, survival
seemed imminent and real. Counsel did not add a claim for wrongful death
in the action pending until Otober 31, 1952, and then it was too late. The
three year period for tort is long, but if the tort leads to death, the claim
under Lord Campbell's Act must be filed within a year after the death.
At the trial in Hudson the judge treated the case as if the man had died
from causes other than the tort. Loss of time amounted to $6,000 exactly.
Expenses of the illness had been covered by the United States in the Bethesda
Naval Hospital. Pain and suffering in a survival action had been eliminated
by statute. Six thousand dollars was all the plaintiff got in the trial court, but
things were different in the court of appeals. The doctor's bills and the
expenses of the illness, the court said, must be considered by the jury in
fixing the price of a tort. The court referred to the doctrine of collateral re-
sources. A defendant cannot profit because a plaintiff has other resources to
cover the expenses. Although the legislature scratched pain and suffering,
it did literally include the physical injury. A jury may consider it, and here
97. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1967).
98. 23 Stat. 307 (1885).
99. See, e.g., United States Elec. Lighting Co. v. Sullivan, 22 App. D.C. 115 (1903);
Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Golway, 6 App. D.C. 143 (1895).
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there was evidence that the decedent had suffered a loss of hearing as a result
of the accident. But the biggest factor which the court said the jury could
consider was impairment of earning capacity. 100 After a new trial the jury
found a verdict for $30,000, and the plaintiff had to claim through the insured
in a separate action against the defendant's insurance company to recover on
the $30,000 judgment.' 0 '
Hudson is a vital case. It can be significant to lawyers everywhere as an
illustration of good judging, but it has to be inspected with a microscope.
The case had a sequel.' 0 2 Four years later in another death case where the
decedent had not lingered long, the plaintiff's lawyers asked for damages to
the estate and for damages to the statutory beneficiary. Defendant's counsel
objected to the joining of the two causes of action and argued that the plaintiff
must make a choice. In a short per curiam opinion the court agreed with
the plaintiff. There are two causes of action and they can be joined.'03
How much a plaintiff can collect on each can be determined only after trial.
In Hudson v. Lazarus the court was positive. Impairment of earning capac-
ity and pecuniary loss to beneficiaries cannot both be used to measure the
same claim.
The measure for pecuniary loss to beneficiaries has been well established
in the District for a long time. It is easy to predict which measure the court
will prescribe for wrongful death when a case like the sequel gets to the
court of appeals after trial. It can be a case where an injured plaintiff has
lingered for days or weeks, but not necessarily as long as Hudson. There are
100. Judge Edgerton had some case law to support his disposition. Under the
Iowa survival statute which includes wrongful death by interpretation, impairment of
earning capacity is the standard measure. Scott v. Hinman, 216 Iowa 1126, 249 N.W.
249 (1933); Benton v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 55 Iowa 496, 8 N.W. 330 (1881).
Other courts have had to adjust to special circumstances in a death case and to use
a measure like Hudson's. See Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168,
187 N.W. 806 (1922); West v. Boston & Me. R.R., 81 N.H. 522, 129 A. 768 (1925)
and especially Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942) the first case
after survival of tort was enacted in 1937.
101. Lazarus v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
102. Sornborger v. District Dental Lab., Inc., 266 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
103. You could write a special comment on joinder, res judicata and splitting
causes of action. That is beyond the scope of this paper. In Iowa and Louisiana
where there are no separate statutes like Lord Campbell's Act, the claims must bejoined. See Fitzgerald v. Hale, 247 Iowa 1194, 78 N.W.2d 509 (1956). It is com-
mon practice in some states to join the two counts. Quaere: must they be joined
to avoid splitting causes of action? See Sornborger v. District Dental Lab., Inc., 266
F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Coulson v. Shirks Motor Express Corp., 48 Del. 561,
107 A.2d 922 (1954); Finnegan v. Checker Taxi Co., 300 Mass. 62, 14 N.E.2d 127(1938); Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942). That they do
not have to be joined see Allen v. Burdette, 139 Ohio St. 208, 39 N.E.2d 153 (1942);
Landers v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 369 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1963). Do you have to go to bat
twice on the merits? See Deep Rock Oil Corp. v. Sheridan, 173 F.2d 186 (10th Cir.
1949).
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two causes of action. They can be litigated in one proceeding. It is not
important to classify expenses of the illness and death as items to be allowed
under one claim or the other. In either event they are allocated to cover
the claims of special creditors or to reimburse people who have paid those
claims. Loss of time can be measured and this is an asset of the general
estate. So too is the evaluation for the physical injury which in our hypo-
thetical can be more than nominal. But on the big item there will be no
choice. The claim will be processed like one for wrongful death. 04  The
measure of damage for the beneficiary will be the one that has been standard
in the District for many years, and that part of the proceeds will be protected
against the decedent's creditors.
There is still another implication from Hudson that will have to be re-
solved. Suppose the next of kin who survive the decedent are grown
brothers and sisters who have not been receiving gifts or contributions from
him during his life. The decedent has lingered long and has suffered some
disability, but no action was pending at his death. Nor is any action begun
immediately thereafter. With the advice of a lawyer the brothers and sisters
wait until more than a year after the death to have one of them appointed
a personal representative. But they do begin an action under the survival
statute within three years after the accident. Hudson v. Lazarus could
be a windfall. The plaintiff argues that his case is controlled by Hudson.
Impairment of earning capacity is a vital factor, he argues, in computing
damages for the estate. It was a bit of wisdom to help Mrs. Hudson who
needed a substantial sum to compensate her for her loss. The brothers and
sisters do not need that kind of help. At the time of Hudson there were few
guidelines for District lawyers about survival, and a case was pending.
There was good faith in Hudson. The delay was an honest mistake; it was
not planned. In the hypothetical the personal representative would get ex-
penses for the estate, something for loss of time, maybe something for the
disability and that is it.
Trends and possibilities
The nineteen-sixties were typical in the plaintiffs' era-bigger verdicts, wider
areas of responsibility, more ground rules in statutes and ordinances-but
there was nothing basically different like workmen's compensation 55 years
104. Cf. Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1967). This was a death case and one for survival against the hospital for negli-
gence in caring for the deceased. Time had expired on the death claim, but the court
granted an extension of the statutory year because the defendant had refused to permit
the plaintiff to inspect hospital records.
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ago. 105 There was no trend toward compulsory automobile liability insurance
or statutory programs on unsatisfied judgments. The really big news during
the nineteen-sixties in the personal injury business was the Keeton-O'Connell
no-fault plan for automobile users. 10 6 That sparked much discussion, some
opposition, 107 some counter proposals,10 8 and some thinking that no-fault
plans may be good in other areas.10 9
No-fault liability is not one of the principal topics in this paper. Never-
theless, it deserves some comment because lawyers cannot dodge it during
the reappraisal. Although automobile using creates most of the litigation in
torts, there are other vital areas. Products liability is moving up to strict
liability, and many customers are injured on proprietors' premises. Even on
a lesser level plaintiffs still sue for assault and battery and false imprison-
ment. A no-fault program can be big enough to cover everything. There
are serious problems about damages. Will they be fixed in schedules, or
will they be determined by administrators under general statutory standards
on economic loss? Old-fashioned trespass cases where litigants sue for vin-
dication only may be relegated to the criminal law. Keeton and O'Connell
have suggested a dividing of claims, compulsory insurance, no-fault and
economic loss up to $15,000 to be covered by the claimant's insurance car-
rier, fault and damages at common law for everything over $15,000 to be
underwritten by the tortfeasor's liability insurer, if he has one. If most
lawyers and plaintiffs shoot for both levels, it could defeat the purpose of the
program. Adequate fees for lawyers are vital. The scheme for measuring
fees must be generous because the community cannot afford to sacrifice the
adversary system.
If lawmakers were starting from scratch, they would codify Lord Camp-
bell's Act with legislation on survival."10 Too many people in too many
105. You can second guess yourself just a little bit. Iowa's statute on tort liability
for governmental subdivisions is not revolutionary, but it is more than a codification of
the Iowa case law. Ch. 405, [1967] Iowa Laws 793; IowA CODE §§ 613 A.1 -A.11
(Supp. 1970).
106. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
(1965); Keeton & O'Connell, The Basic Protection Plan for Traffic Accident Losses,
43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 184 (1967); cf. L. GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND
INSURANCE (1958); Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1964).
107. Blum & Kalven, A Stopgap Plan for Compensating Auto Accident Victims,
1968 INS. L.J. 661-70.
108. Address by Paul S. Wise, American Mutual Insurance Alliance, White Sulphur
Springs, West Virginia, July 11, 1968; AMERICAN INSURANCE ALLIANCE, REPORT OF
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND EVALUATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PRO-
TECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE REPARATIONS (1968). See DEFENSE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, SPECIAL REPORT: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE (1969).
109. Szakats, Compensation for Personal Injury: Individual Liability or Col-
lective Responsibility? 3 U. TASM. L. REV. 204 (1969).
110. There has been some codification and some correlating of statutes. Parlia-
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states have had to wait too long for survival against the estates of dead tort-
feasors. After wrongful death, that would have priority in a composite stat-
ute. It does not help now to speculate about the long delay. Master-servant
with respondeat superior reduced some of the sting. Employers had to cover
the costs of employees' torts that were related to the business, whether or not
the tortfeasor survived the events. Before 1915-25 most individual tort-
feasors were judgment proof, dead or alive. Liability insurance carrying by
automobile owners revealed the absurdities of the common law. All states
have some kind of provision for survival against dead tortfeasors. Louisiana
does not have it literally, but with the direct action statute against insurance
carriers, survival against tortfeasors' estates is not crucial.
The pressures for survival on the plaintiff's side when an injured man dies
from causes other than the tort are not so obvious. Economic loss before
death may not be enough to justify litigation. Although pain and suffering
can be severe, they are a kind of subterfuge to justify big verdicts. They
sound unreal as a measure of price for anyone but a sufferer himself. For
the District of Columbia, Congress has excluded pain and suffering expressly
from all survival cases."' It was done so inexpertly that pain and suffering
are excluded literally even in those cases where an injured living plaintiff
proceeds against the estate of a dead tortfeasor. If pain and suffering are
excluded from the computation in survival cases on the plaintiff's side, and
whether or not death follows an injury, a plaintiff's attorneys fees must be
covered by the tortfeasor. That is not as bad as it sounds. It is so provided
now by statute in Oregon. 1 2 Contingent fees make it possible to cover over-
head in the cases lawyers have to litigate and those they lose. Fees can be
fixed by the court, and they can be big enough to make the system work."13
In spite of foot-dragging by courts and legislatures in death cases for four
generations, the signs in the sixties have been good. There is new
legislation, and there are decisions. When Judge Talbott Smith was on the
Supreme Court of Michigan, he wrote a classic on death and damages in
ment did it in the Fatal Accidents Law of 1934, see note 32, supra. In 1966 the
New York legislature redrafted the survival act to cover all injury and death cases.
N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAWS § 11-3.2 (McKinney 1967). At the same time
the legislature redrafted the wrongful death act, Section 5-4.1 of the same law. The
South Dakota statutes were simplified by an editorial commission and republished in
1967. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-4-1, 15-4-2, 21-5-1, 21-5-2. Although the
Minnesota legislature has not tried to redraft a comprehensive scheme, the sections
on survival and wrongful death follow consecutively in the same chapter of the statutes.
MINN. STAT. §§ 573.01-.02 (Supp. 1969).
111. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (1967).
112. ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.075 (1967).
113. Fees can be set by the court in New York, and both kinds of cases can bejoined. In re Peterson's Estate, 257 App. Div. 449, 13 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1939); In re
Applebaum's Estate, 41 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sur. Ct. 1943).
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Wycko v. Gnodtke. 14 The decedent was a boy of fourteen. Under Lord
Campbell's Act in Michigan the boy's parents were the beneficiaries, and the
father sued as the personal representative. The boy was riding on a bicycle
when he was struck by the defendant's car. He died immediately after the
accident, and under the Michigan law there was no claim for pain and suf-
fering. The trial judge instructed the jury that the measure of the parents'
pecuniary loss was the boy's earning power, the difference between what the
boy would have earned before maturity and cost of his rearing. The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff, $14,000 for the pecuniary loss to the bene-
ficiaries and $1,000 to the estate for expenses. The trial judge granted the
defendant's motion for a new trial unless the plaintiff would accept $7,500.
He said the verdict was out of line with the measure. The plaintiff appealed.
The supreme court reversed the trial judge and remanded the case for judg-
ment on the verdict. The court decided that the verdict was consistent with
what the measure ought to be. Pecuniary loss is not as tight as the courts
pegged it in the old law. An individual has value to the family as a func-
tioning social group. Death creates an economic loss which is related to
human companionship, and it can be translated into figures. Three judges
dissented. They could have been writing in 1921.
Gray v. Goodson' 5 from Washington state was a narrow issue death case.
Does a cause of action abate with the death of the first beneficiary? The
question is not unique. The courts and legislature in Louisiana worked on it
for 60 years. But the solution is not easy. Gray points up some difficulties.
There were no Washington death statute cases precisely on point when the
case was decided in 1963 and in 1956, when the automobile accident in
Gray occurred, claims in simple tort did not survive an injured man's death
from other causes."16 The decedent left only his wife as a possible benefi-
ciary. She died while an action was pending and after the state supreme
court had reversed a judgment in favor of one of the defendants."17 The
action was continued on behalf of the wife's daughter who was not related
to the decedent except through her mother's marriage. The defendants'
lawyers argued that the claim abated with the mother's death. To permit
survival to her heirs, they contended, would defeat the purpose of the death
114. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
115. 61 Wash. 2d 319, 378 P.2d 413 (1963). The decedent was killed in the
accident. How long he lingered is not indicated. The personal representative was
appointed within a week of the accident.
116. See Marvin v. McCall & McDonald Inc., 57 Wash. 2d 906, 357 P.2d 173
(1960); Boyd v. Sibold, 7 Wash. 2d 279, 109 P.2d 535 (1941). This has been cured
by statute. Ch. 137, § 1, [1961] Wash. Laws 1681, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046
(1962).
117. Woods v. Goodson, 55 Wash. 2d 687, 349 P.2d 731 (1960).
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statute. But the court upheld the claim of the daughter as the heir of the
first beneficiary. There were no alternate beneficiaries. Unless it survived
the beneficiary's heir, the wrongful death action would fail completely.
The solution in Gray and the solution under the Louisiana statute are too
pat. You wonder in Gray how much was in the case to justify litigation
through the state supreme court. Even if the original decedent had lingered
long after the accident, a claim for loss of time and pain and suffering did
not survive in 1956. The pecuniary loss to the wife could have been sub-
stantial. She survived her husband by three years and four months. The
case had been long in litigation; costs and disbursements could have been
piling up. Under Washington decisions expenses of the death and the fu-
neral can be recovered under wrongful death. 118 Perhaps the sum of these
figures would be big enough to justify litigation to the bitter end, but the
sum would have to be big enough to cover the lawyer's fees.
Any kind of abatement in personal injury or death cases, because of the
death of injured persons or tortfeasors, or because of the death of a benefi-
ciary under wrongful death, is unjust. Judge Comstock characterized the
common law as "manifestly unjust" more than a century ago, but he was
thinking only of cases where death followed personal injuries. Presently,
little is left of common law abatement. It is true almost everywhere that
tort actions do not abate with the death of the parties. In only two states
have the legislatures failed to cure abatement in the little cases on a plaintiff's
side where he dies from other causes. Minnesota is one of them. Washing-
ton cured it in 1961. The score may look even better on the issue of the
Gray case, but the score is only one side of the coin. The hard question is
how do you cure that kind of abatement when the first beneficiary dies. 119
It is not easy to think through the consequences of any kind of remedy
and to prescribe a cure that is consistent with the scheme of Lord Campbell's
Act. There are only two possibilities, but these can be supplemented with
collateral provisions. After the first beneficiary dies, the original claim can
118. See McMullen v. Warren Motor Co., 174 Wash. 454, 25 P.2d 99 (1933);
Castner v. Tacoma Gas & Fuel Co., 126 Wash. 657, 219 P. 12 (1923).
119. The decisions in Lou'siana and Gray are not isolated cases. The problem
arises often, and the decisions cut both ways. That the action under Lord Camp-
bell's Act does not abate even without an express statutory provision, see Meekin v.
Brooklyn Heights R.R., 164 N.Y. 145, 58 N.E. 50 (1900) (claim can be processed
by the alternate beneficiary). That the cause of action abates without a special statute,
see Campbell v. Western & A.R.R., 57 Ga. App. 209, 194 S.E. 927 (1938); Dillier
v. Cleveland C., C. & St. L. Ry., 34 Ind. App. 52, 72 N.E. 271 (1904); Danis v. New
York Cent. R.R., 160 Ohio St. 474, 117 N.E.2d 39 (1954). But the picture is
changing fast. In Illinois the Supreme Court overruled an earlier decision and pre-
served a claim against abatement for the beneficiary's heirs. McDaniel v. Bullard, 34
Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966). And a Florida court has just decided to protect
the beneficiary's heirs. Bohannon v. McGowan, 222 So. 2d 60 (Fla. App. 1969).
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survive to the alternate beneficiaries, or the claim of the first beneficiary can
survive to his heirs or next of kin. 120 By statute in Louisiana the claim in all
cases survives to the beneficiary's heirs. By decision in Gray it survives also
the beneficiary's heirs-at least in that kind of case! Sometimes the practical
differences between one scheme or the other will be minimal. Grown chil-
dren may be the alternate beneficiaries of their father, the original decedent,
and the heirs of their mother, the first beneficiary. But there can be other
cases like Gray. The list of alternate beneficiaries under a death statute
does not usually extend through all the levels of the original decedent's next
of kin. There can be cases when there are no alternate beneficiaries, and
where an action can fail.
Perhaps legislators cannot anticipate every contingency. When they do
prescribe for wrongful death, they are thinking of relatives who have been
accustomed to rely on the decedent for some kind of help. But injuries pre-
ceding death can produce other effects, pain and suffering, loss of time, and
expense. Even when injured persons die immediately there are death and
funeral expenses. All these factors can be covered in a comprehensive
scheme. Survival to the alternate beneficiaries rather than survival for the
first beneficiary's heirs is consistent with Lord Campbell's Act. All tort
actions should survive to permit recovery by the estate for economic loss.
Pain and suffering can be scrapped, and lawyers fees can be charged against
tortfeasors. In a case like Gray, the item for pecuniary loss to the wife
would be lost. It is even possible that there were no heirs of the original
decedent who could be interested in an administration of the estate. Al-
though the remedy in Gray could be a windfall to a stranger, someone sup-
ported the wife for three and a half years after her husband's death. A claim
for reimbursement against the tortfeasor can be litigated through the survival
action.
This paper has been long. A final summing-up can be short. The com-
mon law absolutes were so well entrenched that lawyers had no choice.
Death and survival had to be covered by statute. Caution was part of the
game in the nineteenth century, and that meant strict construction and literal
precedents. Judge Comstock was out of step in 1860. A century later the
world is different, and the law is different. Millions of people, even tens of
120. Tennessee tried to solve the problem by statute a long time ago. The statute
looks two ways, to the alternate beneficary if the first one dies before he can sue, to
the next of kin of the first beneficiary if he dies while action is pending. The
Tennessee court has construed the statute to afford the same remedy to the alternate
beneficiary whether the first beneficiary dies before or after action is begun. Ridge v.
Bright, 172 Tenn. 87, 110 S.W.2d 312 (1937). TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-612 to -613
(1955). The text of the statute has not been changed since Ridge, and the case has
not been overruled.
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millions live in the plaintiffs' world. More people are hurt not only actually
but in bigger percentages. Everyone is involved constantly with more of his
neighbors, and more of his neighbors can pay for their torts today than
100 years ago. Whether it is good or whether it is bad, there are more torts
in the plaintiffs' world, bigger judgments and longer court calendars.
The nineteen-seventies can be a time of preparation for an era of no-fault.
There are pressures which may shorten the time. The personal injury busi-
ness costs the community much in money and time, courts struggle to keep up
with it, and many injured people still lack remedies through the civil suit.
Even so, it can happen that lawyers will have to live with fault for a long time
to come. Alternatives are difficult to plan, and fault can be as flexible as
the community can afford to make it. Lawyers did not have to wait for
defective gadgets to develop the idea of strict liability. They had to learn
the hard way how to escape from Winterbottom v. Wright. Escaping from
'Blackstone, Lord Ellenborough and Baker v. Bolton was even more difficult.
But 1970 is a good year for taking stock. We have come a long way with
death and survival since 1921, or 1941, or 1953!121
121. The Minnesota Supreme Court almost muffed one in City of St. Paul v.
Sorenson, - Minn. -, 167 N.W.2d 17 (1969). It was a third party action by an
employer under compensation for reimbursement against the tortfeasor. The injured
employee had died from causes other than the tort. In a stated case the trial judge
bit on abatement and Section 573.01. Judgment for the defendant was reversed on
appeal, and the case was remanded, but the court sweat through nine columns of text
to apologize for catching up with 1969.
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